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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Granted Green's Suppression Motion Because The
Constitutional Standards Governing Arrests Under The Idaho State Constitution Are
Coextensive With The Standards Of The Fourth Amendment
A.

Introduction
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, Officers arrested Green on probable

cause that she was violating Idaho state law by driving on an invalid license.

(R.,

p.318.) This arrest, however, did not comply with Idaho Code§ 49-1407. (R., p.322;
see also I.C. § 49-1407(1).) While acknowledging that the constitutional standards for
arrest under the Fourth Amendment do not depend on state law, and offering no basis
for interpreting the Idaho State Constitution differently, the district court determined that
the arrest was unreasonable under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution
because it did not comply with Idaho Code§ 49-1407. (R., pp.320-27.)
The state appealed arguing that there is no basis for interpreting the Idaho State
Constitution differently than the United States Constitution with respect to arrest
standards. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-10.) In response, Green argues that the violation of
Idaho Code§ 49-1407 impacts her constitutional rights. (Respondent's brief, pp.8-18.)
Green's argument fails.

Green's arrest was reasonable and lawful under the Fourth

Amendment and, like the district court, she has failed to show any reason for
interpreting differently the arrest standards under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State
Constitution.

Her seizure was therefore constitutional and the district court's order

suppressing evidence should be reversed.
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8.

Standard Of Review
"Both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are

questions of law over which this Court exercises free review." Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho
35, 40,232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010) (citation omitted).

C.

Arrests Conducted On The Basis Of Probable Cause Are Constitutional
The United States Supreme Court has held that "warrantless arrests for crimes

committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution,
and that while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state
restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections." Virginia v. Moore, 553
U.S. 164, 176 (2008). Though our Court is "free to interpret our state constitution as
more protective of the rights of Idaho citizens than the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the federal constitution," State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987, 842
P.2d 660, 666 (1992) (citations omitted), the Idaho Supreme Court "will use federal
rules and methodology unless clear precedent or circumstances unique to the state of
Idaho or its constitution indicates that Idaho's constitution provides greater protection
than the analogous federal provision," CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Insurance Fund,
154 Idaho 379, 384, 299 P.3d 186, 191 (2013). Because there are no circumstances
unique to the state of Idaho, its constitution, or its long-standing jurisprudence, the
standard for arrest under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution should be
interpreted coextensively with the standard under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution: Probable cause that the defendant is violating the law.
On appeal, Green asserts that, "[w]hile an unlawful arrest does not violate the
Fourth Amendment, long-standing jurisprudence indicates that Article I, § 17 is more
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protective than the Fourth Amendment in this context."

(Respondent's brief, p.8.)

Green then offers zero examples of the "long-standing jurisprudence" where this Court
has ever held that Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution provides greater
protections than the Fourth Amendment in the context of arrest standards. The cases
she does cite are of questionable relevance at best.
Green cites State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978). In that case, the
Idaho Supreme Court "expressly adopt[ed] the exigent circumstances exception to the
'knock and announce' statutes."

&

at 588, 586 P.2d at 673.

The Court further

determined that "a case by case analysis must be made to determine if exigent
circumstances exist as there can be no blanket exceptions."
(citations omitted).

&

at 590, 586 P.2d at 675

Finally the Court explained that, generally, exigent circumstances

that would allow officers to dispense with the knock and announce requirement would
be "(1) a reasonable belief that compliance with a 'knock and announce' statute would
result in the destruction of evidence, or (2) a reasonable belief that compliance would
place the officer in peril."

&

(citations omitted).

Contrary to Green's assertions, the Court's holding in Rauch is irrelevant "in this
context." First, Rauch, a case which considered exceptions to the knock and announce
rule when serving search warrants, does not set forth the standards for what constitutes
a constitutional arrest.

Second, the Court's holding in Rauch is consistent with the

precedent of the United States Supreme Court. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 4041 (1963) (approving the exigent circumstances exception to the knock and announce
rule); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997) (rejecting a blanket exception to
the knock and announce rule for drug crimes); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936
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(1995) (recognizing that the knock and announce requirement could give way "under
circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence," or "where police officers have
reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were
given."). Green has failed to show that the Court's holding in Rauch interprets the Idaho
State Constitution differently than the United States Constitution in regards to complying
with the knock and announce rule, much less in regards to arrest standards.
Green also cites State v. Matthews, 129 Idaho 865, 934 P.2d 931 (1997), which
held that, where a warrant has not been signed by a judge and the defendant
challenges the validity of that warrant, the search pursuant to that warrant must stop
until a signature has been obtained.

kl at 870,

934 P.2d at 936. Like Rauch, this case

has no bearing on the standards for arrest. It is therefore irrelevant.
Green cites Matthews for the proposition that "the search-warrant must conform
strictly to the constitutional and statutory provisions providing for its issuance."
869, 934 P.2d at 935 (quotation omitted).

kl

at

But this language does not assist her

argument even by analogy. Matthews does not stand for the proposition that statutory
violations require suppression.

The Court specifically rejected that interpretation in

State v. Bicknell, 140 Idaho 201, 91 P.3d 1105 (2004), explaining:
The Matthews Court held invalid a search warrant that had not
been signed. The majority did not base their opinion simply upon statutory
requirements that the search warrant be signed, but upon a "substantive
right in a citizen to refuse to permit a search pursuant to an unsigned
warrant" that was "affirmed by Article XXI, Section 2 of the Idaho
Constitution." The Matthews majority also cited Article I, § 17, as
establishing a substantive right to a signed search warrant. Rather, in
both cases the Court held that the error in question also impacted the
constitutional rights of the defendant.

4

Bicknell, 140 Idaho at 204, 91 P.3d at 1108 (internal citations omitted).

The state

acknowledges that an officer's failure to comply with both constitutional and statutory
provisions necessarily violates the constitution, because the failure to comply with the

constitutional provisions is sufficient by itself to violate the constitution.
The Idaho Supreme Court's reasoning in Matthews actually undermines Green's
argument. According to that Court, the reason the statutes' requirement that warrants
be signed to be valid was constitutionally significant was because they "predate[d] the
Constitution of the State of Idaho" and so the rights they created were incorporated by
Article XXI, Section 2.

Matthews, 129 Idaho at 870, 934 P.2d at 936.

Conversely,

Idaho Code § 49-1407 does not "predate the Constitution of the State of Idaho," so even
if it created some right, that right would not be constitutionally significant.
Finally, Green cites to State v. Card, 137 Idaho 182, 45 P.3d 838 (2002), for her
argument that statutory violations require suppression of evidence. Any such holding by
the Court in Card has been abrogated by later Court decisions. See Bicknell, 140 Idaho
at 203-04, 91 P.3d at 1107-08 (exclusionary rule not appropriate for procedural errors
that do not violate the constitution); State v. Zueger, 143 Idaho 647, 650, 152 P.3d 8, 11
(2006) (exclusionary rule requires a constitutional violation and for there to be a
constitutional violation the defect must call into question the Constitution's requirement
of probable cause); see also State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 313 P.3d 732 (Ct. App.
2013) ("Card appears to have been abrogated by later decisions."). As recognized by
the Supreme Court in Moore, courts should not impose constitutional remedies for mere
statutory violations. See Moore, 553 U.S. at 174. Rather, the legislature is able, and
should be allowed, to determine the remedy for violations of its statutes.
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Ultimately, Green argues that statutory violations which impact constitutional
rights violate the constitution. (Respondent's brief, pp.11-18.) But Green fails to identify
a single constitutional right that was violated by the officer's failure to comply with Idaho
Code§ 49-1407. Under the United States Constitution, an officer may make an arrest
based on probable cause that the law has been violated. Moore, 553 U.S. at 176. The
question for this Court is whether Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho State Constitution
provides greater protections than the United States Constitution in regards to the
standards for arrest. Green, like the district court below, has failed to show any basis
for interpreting the Idaho State Constitution differently than the United States
Constitution in this regard.
The constitutional standard for arrest is probable cause that the defendant is
violating the law. Officers had probable cause to believe that Green was violating the
law by driving on an invalid license. Green's arrest was therefore constitutional and the
district court erred by suppressing the evidence in this case.

Its order should be

reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
granting Green's suppression motion, and remand this case for further proceedings.

DATED this 27th day of October, 2014.

(~R~
Deputy Attorney General
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